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The Unusual Dynamic of the Eichmann Trial: 
Prosecution and Defense Versus the Court 
 FRANK TUERKHEIMER* 
The Eichmann trial stands as a milestone both in the history of the 
Holocaust and in law.1 The law part is easy. The trial brought to justice 
a principal operator in the most pernicious conspiracy in history: the 
conspiracy to murder eleven million Jews.2 It is a given that the most 
severe sanction the law can impose in a civilized system is a quickly 
administered death penalty.3 Eichmann’s conviction and execution 
meant the law succeeded in arriving at a just result. Historically, the 
trial was significant because it humanized the Holocaust and, through 
the new medium of television, brought that human element to the 
world.4 
The ability of the prosecution to educate the public at large about 
the Holocaust, as opposed to more narrowly confining itself to what 
Eichmann did and said, rested on both the determination to do so, and 
the unusual dynamic of the trial and its tensions. Perhaps the best way 
to articulate these tensions is to look at the three fundamental players in 
a criminal trial: the court, the prosecution, and the defense. What is truly 
unusual about the Eichmann trial is that in broad terms, the prosecution 
and defense were aligned while the court tangled with the two, mainly 
 
* Frank Tuerkheimer is Professor of Law Emeritus at the University of Wisconsin Law School. 
 1.  DANIEL LEVY & NATAN SZNAIDER, THE HOLOCAUST AND MEMORY IN THE GLOBAL 
AGE 105 (Assenka Oksiloff trans., 2006). 
 2. The Wannsee Protocol and a 1994 Report on Auschwitz by the Office of Strategic 
Services, in 11 THE HOLOCAUST: SELECTED DOCUMENTS IN EIGHTEEN VOLUMES (John 
Mendelsohn ed., 2010) [hereinafter The Wannsee Protocol].  
 3.  Richard Lowell Nygaard, On Death as Punishment, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 825, 826 
(1996). 
 4.  Sara J. Bloomfield, Op-Ed: From the Nuremberg and Eichmann Trials, a Challenge for 
Today, JTA: THE GLOBAL NEWS SERVICE OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE (May 1, 2011), 
http://www.jta.org/news/article/2011/05/01/3087351/op-ed-from-the-nuremberg-and-eichmann-
trials-a-challenge-for-today (explaining that the fifteen-year gap between the major Nuremberg 
trial of 1945–46, and the Eichmann trial in 1961, saw the enormous spread of television in the 
communications media. The world learned about Nuremberg largely through newspapers; 
television brought the Eichmann trial to millions of homes). 
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the prosecution. In a nutshell, the prosecution wished to present as much 
of a picture of the Holocaust as could be legitimately based on the 
charges brought, and it was the court, rather than Eichmann, who stood 
in the way.  
For starters, the prosecution had enormous latitude since the 
conspiracy, of which Eichmann was charged with being part, was itself 
of historical dimensions.5 The general rule is that in conspiracy trials, 
the prosecution is not limited to proving only what a particular 
defendant did, but whatever was done in furtherance of the conspiracy.6 
For example, in a prosecution against the kingpin of a massive drug 
importation conspiracy, most of the trial will be consumed with proof of 
what lower level operatives did, persons totally unknown to those 
masterminding the operation. Indeed, a standard jury instruction on 
conspiracy is that a particular defendant need not know all the members 
of the conspiracy; all that matters is that they act in concert to effect a 
larger criminal purpose.7  
Thus, it was perfectly consistent with the rules governing 
conspiracy trials for the prosecution in the Eichmann case to place into 
evidence the killings conducted by the Einsatzgruppen, roving SS bands 
that followed the German army eastward across western Russia after the 
phenomenal success with which the Germans invaded the Soviet 
Union.8 That success, coupled with earlier military victories, placed the 
vast majority of Europe’s Jews under German control and permitted the 
realization of Hitler’s earlier prophecy that another World War would 
mark the annihilation of European Jewry.9 That Eichmann did not pull 
the trigger on one of the 1–1.5 million Jews killed by the 
Einsatzgruppen mattered not a bit. While they were doing their part, he 
was doing his—a conventional division of responsibility in any 
conspiracy.10 
 
 5.  MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN: RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS IN 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF JERUSALEM, ISRAEL 3 (1992) (although the word “conspiracy” did not 
appear in the charge, the allegation was that Eichmann acted in concert with others; for example, 
the first count of the indictment alleged that Eichmann, “together with others” caused the deaths 
of millions of Jews) [hereinafter Eichmann Trial Record].   
 6. See, e.g., 5 LEONARD B. SAND, MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 19–51 (2011) 
(providing the necessary element of commission of an overt act to prove a charge of conspiracy in 
the United States). 
 7. See, e.g., id. at 19–31 (providing the necessary element of knowing, willing, and 
voluntary membership to prove a charge of conspiracy in the United States). 
 8. Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 3. 
 9. Hitler’s actual term, the German: “Vernichtung.” 
 10. See, e.g., SAND, supra note 6, at 19–32.  
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How did this bring about the unusual alignment of prosecution and 
defense on one side and the court on the other? The court, sitting 
without a jury, was interested in Eichmann; it needed no instructions on 
the Holocaust.11 Aside from what they knew as educated persons, each 
of the three judges had left Germany for Palestine in the 1930s and it 
would be unusual if none of their extended families had emerged 
unscathed from the Holocaust. The prosecution’s effort to paint a 
broader picture was, from their perspective, unnecessary and 
unhelpful.12  The defense did not object to this “larger picture” approach 
that characterized what the prosecution did because it found it 
advantageous for the record to be saturated with facts having no 
connection to Eichmann at all. For example, when the prosecution 
offered into evidence the “diary” of Hans Frank, the German Governor-
General of a major chunk of Poland during the war, there was no 
objection from the defense.13 This diary consisted of memoranda, 
speeches, and a rather complete history of Frank’s brutal administration 
in Poland, which Frank preserved, perhaps because he thought that his 
conflicts with the SS, fully documented in the diary, might be 
exculpatory.14 
That this was not so was Frank’s misfortune at the first Nuremberg 
trial where the details of the diary turned out to be dynamite evidence 
for the prosecution’s case.15 At Eichmann’s trial, a small part of the 
diary was read into evidence, specifically documents showing that 
Frank complained that it would be impossible to rid Europe of Jewry in 
a short time since Jews had been around for five thousand years.16 
Eichmann’s lawyer, Robert Servatius, who knew the diary well from his 
work as defense counsel at the first Nuremberg trial, did not object to its 
admission or this reading from it and on cross-examination of the 
witness, through whom it was put into evidence, asked only one 
question: Was the name of Adolph Eichmann mentioned in any of these 
twenty-nine volumes?17 The answer was that there was no mention of 
 
 11. Gary Grobman, Eichmann: Trial Info, PBS ONLINE (1997), 
http://remember.org/eichmann/study4.htm. 
 12. See, e.g., Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 397–98. 
 13. Id. at 392.  
 14. Id. 
 15. Hans Frank, HOLOCAUST EDUC. & ARCHIVE RES. TEAM (2007), 
http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org/ar/frank.html. 
 16. Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 395.  
 17. Id. at 396. 
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Eichmann.18 The prosecution was thus satisfied: a major component of 
Holocaust history was now in evidence; Eichmann was satisfied: among 
the hundreds of thousands of words proving this Holocaust component, 
his name did not appear, thereby arguably minimizing his role. The 
court was burdened with a record that was of no help. 
The question of Jewish resistance raised comparable issues. How, 
conceivably, could the resistance of Jews be part of the conspiracy? 
Thus, when the prosecution indicated it was calling a witness to testify 
as to the Warsaw Ghetto revolt, it described the proposed testimony as 
part of “the general picture.”19 At that point the court stated: 
This is a very delicate matter, Mr. Hausner. I know that. But I do not 
have to tell you we are not presenting a general picture here. If the 
picture is portrayed incidentally in the course of the trial – well and 
good; but we have an indictment and this indictment constitutes a 
framework for the trial.20 
The prosecution then proceeded, completely oblivious to the 
court’s expressed desire to contain such general picture evidence. There 
is more than posturing to the prosecution’s position. The first count of 
the charge against Eichmann accused him of violating Israeli law by, 
together with others, causing the deaths of millions of Jews by 
implementing a plan, which was called The Final Solution to the Jewish 
Question.21 There can be no doubt that the evidence showed Eichmann’s 
awareness of the breadth of the conspiracy. His undisputed involvement 
at the Wansee Conference, where the object of killing eleven million 
Jews was brought to the attention of the major bureaucratic entities of 
the Third Reich, amply demonstrated his awareness.22  
Other subtle details demonstrated such awareness as well. The 
court received into evidence the statement of Dieter Wisliceny, an 
Eichmann subordinate.23 At his trial in Czechoslovakia, Wisliceny 
testified that Eichmann told him, “Himmler has received orders from 
Hitler for the complete biological extermination of European Jewry.”24 
In response to the court’s concern that a general picture was to be 
avoided, the prosecution’s answer was simple: Jews killed while 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 397. 
 20. Id. at 397–98. 
 21. Id. at 3. 
 22.  Id. at 1420–26. 
 23.  Id. at 237. 
 24. Id. at 884.  
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resisting were no less victims of the Holocaust than those killed without 
resistance. To prove that they were killed required placing into evidence 
the context of their killing which, it turned out, was in the context of 
resistance. It is one thing for the court to say that such evidence was not 
helpful in assessing Eichmann’s guilt or innocence. It is another, 
however, to say that the evidence is not admissible. 
Evidence of Jewish resistance tended to precipitate the collision 
between the court and the prosecution. During the testimony of Abba 
Kovner, a Lithuanian resistance fighter who testified about resistance 
efforts both in the Vilna ghetto and in the Lithuanian countryside, the 
prosecution asked the court for “patience” as it approached what the 
prosecution deemed a very important subject.25  The court responded: “I 
do not believe that you can complain of a lack of patience on the part of 
the court.”26 Kovner, in extraordinarily dramatic testimony, went on to 
disparage the question as to why there was not more resistance, stating 
that the question should be how come there was resistance at all.27 At 
the end of this dramatic testimony, the following colloquy between the 
court and prosecution took place: 
Presiding Judge: Thank you very much, Mr. Kovner. Mr. Hausner, 
we have heard shocking things here, in the language of a poet, but I 
maintain that in many parts of this evidence we have strayed far from 
the subject of this trial. There is no possibility at all of interrupting 
evidence such as this, while it is being rendered, out of respect for 
the witness and out of respect for the matters he is relating. It is your 
task to prepare the witness, to explain matters to him, and to 
eliminate everything that is not relevant to the trial, so as not to place 
the Court once again – and this is not the first time – in such a 
situation. I regret that I have to make these remarks, after the 
conclusion of evidence such as this.  
Attorney General: Your Honours, perhaps when my turn comes for a 
final summation of my arguments, it will become clear to the Court 
that these things are not of such a nature.  
Presiding Judge: This was not the first time that I have mentioned 
this. The Court has a certain view of this trial according to the 
indictment, and we have stated this more than once – sometimes in a 
hint, sometimes more clearly, and the Prosecution must direct itself 
in accordance of what it hears from the Court.  
Attorney General: This we do, undoubtedly.  
 
 25. Id. at 461. 
 26. Id. 
 27.  Id. at 461–66. 
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Presiding Judge: Yet, nevertheless, I do not see that these matters 
have penetrated to the extent that they should penetrate.  
Attorney General: Perhaps this is so, because Your Honours are not 
yet aware of everything which we still intend to bring before you.  
Presiding Judge: We heard your opening address which, it seems to 
me, lays down the general lines of what you wish to place before the 
Court.28  
Proof on the lack of resistance was, in fact, within the scope of the 
charge. Why were so many of the prosecution witnesses asked why they 
did not resist—questions that generated Kovner’s criticism of the 
prosecution in which others joined? The answer is simple: the 
conspiracy was designed to deceive its victims, to weaken them, and to 
leave them in no position to resist. For example, most of Warsaw’s Jews 
were taken by train to Treblinka where only those assisting in the 
looting and killing process were spared—and usually just temporarily. 
The distance between Warsaw and Treblinka—about 65 miles—would 
ordinarily take two to three hours by train; it often took two to three 
days or longer.29 Why? To weaken, debilitate and demoralize those 
inside so that upon arrival at Treblinka their trip to the gas chambers 
would proceed smoothly. This too was part of the plan (conspiracy). 
Every conspiracy contains components designed to insure its 
effectiveness. This one was no different. Here, however, Eichmann’s 
involvement was more than just through the conduct of others; he was 
directly implicated.30 
Eichmann coordinated the train schedules.31 The evidence, 
however, proved even more damning. When he arranged for the 
deportation of Jews from Hungary, he arranged for them to send post 
cards to their remaining relatives, post cards that said they should hurry 
and join them before all the good places were taken.32 Perhaps still more 
perniciously, he had the deportees urge their relatives to bring good 
hiking boots, suggesting bucolic strolls in the rustic surroundings of 
 
 28. Id. at 466.  
 29. YITZHAK ARAD, BELZEC, SOBIBOR, TREBLINKA: THE OPERATION REINHARD DEATH 
CAMPS 66 (1987). 
 30. Doron Geller, The Capture of Adolf Eichmann, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR.,  
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/eichcap.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2012). 
 31. See Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 577–78, 592–96 (evidencing Eichmann’s 
involvement in scheduling trains for deportation from France, especially with respect to Jewish 
children). 
 32.  See id. at 944. 
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their destination.33 The duplicity of imagined country walks to facilitate 
further deportations was also to obtain the best possible foot-ware for 
the German military upon the murder of the deportees.34 
There is no question that the prosecution won this regular battle 
with the court. It was difficult for the court to cut off witnesses when the 
defense did not object.  As a consequence, considerable evidence not 
having Eichmann’s fingerprints on it saturates the record of the trial. 
This may have contributed to a massive misinterpretation of the trial 
and Eichmann’s role in the Holocaust. All of this began with a series in 
the New Yorker magazine. 
Within two years of the trial, a series of essays on the trial 
appeared in the New Yorker written by Hannah Arendt.35 By most 
objective standards, Arendt is one of the great intellects of mid-
twentieth century thought. Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism 
remains one of the most incisive dissections of the modern totalitarian 
state, distinguishing it from the despotisms of an earlier day. Thus, it 
should not be surprising that an entire generation of interested persons, 
including me, derived their understanding of the Eichmann trial from 
her articles which later appeared in book form, in two sequential 
editions.36 What are Arendt’s observations that pointed a reader of her 
description of the trial in the wrong direction?  
Although, this is not the occasion to engage in an extended review 
of Arendt’s book, a brief discussion is appropriate.37 Arendt claimed 
that the prosecution, to add stature to its case, puffed up Eichmann’s 
role in the Holocaust beyond what it actually was, thereby enhancing 
the importance of its case and downplaying the role of other 
perpetrators.38 She saw Eichmann not as a pivotal person in the 
implementation of the Final Solution but rather as a dull bureaucrat who 
 
 33.  Gabriel Bach, The Eichmann Trial, 34 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 315, 327 
(2012). 
 34. Interview by Frank Tuerkheimer with Justice Gabriel Bach, Senior Prosecutor in the 
Adolf Eichmann Trial, in Jerusalem, Israel (Nov. 2006), available at 
http://www.eichmannprosecutorinterview.org. 
 35.  Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, NEW YORKER, Feb. 16, 1963, at 40. 
 36.  HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 
(1963). 
 37. One of the Israeli prosecutors at the trial was a historian, and he subsequently wrote 
about Arendt’s take on the trial. JACOB ROBINSON, AND THE CROOKED SHALL BE MADE 
STRAIGHT: THE EICHMANN TRIAL, THE JEWISH CATASTROPHE, AND HANNAH ARENDT’S 
NARRATIVE (1965).  
 38. Amos Elon, Introduction, in EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY 
OF EVIL xiv, xiv (2006).  
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simply did what he was told and tried to do it well. Her view of 
Eichmann is perhaps best summarized in her own statement that 
Eichmann was more clown than monster.39 
My own recent interest in the trial derived from a presentation 
given by Chief Justice Gabriel Bach in New York City almost ten years 
ago. Justice Bach, a senior prosecutor in the case, spoke about the trial 
and mentioned the story of Jenny Cozzi, the Jewish widow of a 
Christian Italian Army officer. Cozzi was detained in Riga, Latvia, and 
the Italian Government, then an ally of Germany in the war, asked that 
in honor and in the memory of her deceased husband, she not be 
deported but be permitted to return to Italy.40 This request crossed 
Eichmann’s desk and he decided against sparing Cozzi, notwithstanding 
the request from the Italian Foreign Office.41 In the end she was 
deported to a concentration camp and became one of the Holocaust’s 
victims.42 
The Eichmann depicted in this brief but telling anecdote was not 
the dull, mechanized bureaucrat that Arendt depicted. Rather, it revealed 
an activist in the plan to murder Jews, dedicated enough to take on an 
ally of Germany in the war to insure that still one more Jew was added 
to the list of those to be killed. The transcript of the trial reveals that the 
Cozzi incident was one of many in which Eichmann’s ardor and 
initiative in killing Jews stands out, which either eluded Arendt, or 
which she simply ignored.43 
Before turning to these other examples of Eichmann’s key role in 
the Holocaust, it is important to see where Eichmann stood in the Nazi 
bureaucracy with respect to the Holocaust. Hitler, of course, was at the 
apex of the conspiracy followed immediately by his number two person, 
Hermann Goering.44 Unquestionably acting pursuant to Hitler’s wishes, 
on July 31, 1941, when it was clear that the invasion of the Soviet 
Union was proceeding well, and the vast majority of European Jewry 
was now or was soon to be under German control, Goering, in a written 
memorandum addressed to Reinhard Heydrich, head of the Main 
Security Office of the Reich (RSHA) advised Heydrich that the RSHA 
 
 39. ARENDT, supra note 36, at 54. 
 40. Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 525. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id. at 518–27; see generally ARENDT, supra note 36 (omitting any mention of the 
Cozzi incident or any similar incidents).  
 44. Richard W. Sonnenfeldt, Remarks, The Nuremberg Trials and the Occupation of 
Germany , 27 CARDOZO L. R. 1609, 1611–12 (2006). 
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would be responsible for implementing the Final Solution to the Jewish 
Question.45 Heydrich’s subordinate in the RSHA was SS Lieutenant 
General Heinrich Mueller and Eichmann was, on paper, subordinate to 
Mueller.46 (Heydrich was assassinated in Czechoslovakia in 1942 and 
replaced by Eichmann’s friend, Ernst Kaltenbrunner)47 One way to look 
at Eichmann is to say that he was low in the bureaucratic process; 
another is to observe that as one worked one’s way down the Nazi 
bureaucracy, Eichmann was the first person whose sole responsibility 
lay with implementing the killing of Jews. All those above him had 
other responsibilities; he did not. 
Eichmann carried out that responsibility with great thoroughness.48 
When a request was made to spare a Jewish scientist with a specialty in 
electronics because of his potential value to the German military, 
Eichmann noted that his invention had already been filed with the 
Patent Office and he should be treated like everyone else.49 The file 
notes that the scientist was deported on the next transport.50  
When Marshal Petain, head of the Vichy Government in France, a 
government openly committed to collaboration with Germany,51 asked 
that a French Jew named Roger Masse be spared, he fared no better. 
Masse was a member of the Legion d’Honneur and had been awarded 
France’s highest military honor, the Croix de Guerre. Eichmann turned 
Petain down, stating, “As a matter of principle I cannot agree to his 
being returned. Please Note. By order – Eichmann.”52  
When it was pointed out to Eichmann that a Swiss Jew named 
Michaelis was married to a Christian woman whose father was 
prominent in Switzerland and inclined to Germany, and that his 
deportation could lead to adverse consequences for Germany in 
 
 45. “Final Solution,” U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L MUSEUM, 
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007328 (last visited Feb. 4, 2013). 
 46. S.S. and Other Nazi Leaders, HOLOCAUST EDUC. & ARCHIVE RES. TEAM (2007), 
http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org/holoprelude/ssleaders.html. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 1836. One of Eichmann’s own witnesses said 
of Eichmann: “[W]hen in doubt, Eichmann always acted in accordance with Party doctrine in its 
most extreme interpretation.”  Id. 
 49. Id. at 602. 
 50. Id.  
 51. The Vichy Regime, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR. (2013), 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/VichyRegime.html (explaining the Prime 
Minister of the Vichy regime, Pierre Laval, had openly declared that he wished for a German 
victory in the war). 
 52. Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 596. 
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Switzerland, Eichmann refused to permit Michaelis to return to 
Switzerland. Eichmann states, “For reasons of principle, I am unable to 
permit [Michaelis to return to Switzerland].”53   
When Eichmann learned that virtually all of Danish Jewry had 
avoided apprehension and that the SS in Denmark refused to knock 
down the doors to Jewish homes when no one answered, he registered a 
virulent complaint with the German Foreign office; he similarly 
expressed his unhappiness over the escape of half of Norway’s Jews to 
Sweden.54 But nowhere is Eichmann’s commitment to the cause of 
Jewish annihilation more evident than the events in Hungary. 
The fate of Hungarian Jewry is nothing less than a tragedy 
imposed on a tragedy. Hungary was an ally of Germany and so, 
administratively, under control of the Hungarians.55 As a consequence, 
from the outbreak of the war in 1939 until early 1944, no organized 
effort had been made to murder Hungary’s Jews.56 By the spring of 
1944, the handwriting on the wall unmistakably pointed to a pending 
German defeat. The Battle of Stalingrad, at which three hundred 
thousand German soldiers were taken prisoner and which reversed the 
direction of troop movement from Germany’s advance eastward to a 
Soviet advance westward, had taken place fifteen months earlier.57 By 
early 1944, The Red Army had driven the Germans out of most of the 
Soviet Union and was marching westward across Eastern Europe 
toward Germany itself.58 The Allies had defeated the Germans in North 
Africa, Italy had collapsed, and the German Army in Italy was 
retreating northwards.59 On the western front, the Allied invasion of 
Normandy was imminent, portending an eastward advance toward 
Germany.60 Further, bombers based in England were regularly pounding 
Germany, impairing, but not eliminating, the industrial base that 
 
 53. Id. at 631. 
 54. Id. at 643–50. 
 55. RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 546 (1985); see also 
Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 928. 
 56. See Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 928; HILBERG, supra note 55, at 796. 
 57. See generally On this Day – 1943: Germans Surrender at Stalingrad, BBC (2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/2/newsid_3573000/3573003.stm (for a 
summary of the Battle of Stalingrad). 
 58.  Alan Taylor, World War II: The Fall of Nazi Germany, ATLANTIC pt. 17 (Oct. 9, 2011) 
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/infocus/2011/10/world-war-ii-the-fall-of-nazi-
germany/100166/#. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
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underlay Germany’s war effort. It was at this point that Eichmann was 
sent to Budapest to dispose of Hungary’s 750,000 Jews.61 
And dispose he did. In a matter of months, half of Hungary’s Jews 
were sent to Auschwitz where almost all were killed. When it was 
questionable whether the crematoria at Auschwitz could handle the new 
load, Eichmann visited Auschwitz and saw to it that twelve thousand 
bodies could be cremated in a day as opposed to ten thousand, which 
had been the prior maximum.62 Eichmann was as motivated to get Jews 
to Auschwitz as he was to the disposal of their murdered bodies. At a 
later point in the deportation process the Regent of Hungary directed 
that trains to Auschwitz be stopped and that an existing train laden with 
Jews for killing be turned around.63 When it returned to the transition 
camp, Eichmann had the Jews placed on trucks and taken to 
Auschwitz.64 In that manner he circumvented the directive of the 
Hungarian Regent designed to end deportations.65  
Indeed, when Himmler himself, in the fall of 1944, directed that 
gassings at Auschwitz stop—not out of a newly found sympathy for 
Jews, but simply because he knew that Germany’s time was running 
out—Eichmann arranged for a march for tens of thousands of Jews to 
the Austrian border under brutally cold November-December 
conditions, resulting in thousands of deaths along the way.66 Himmler 
himself reprimanded Eichmann for this march.67 At that point, the 
advancing Soviet army brought an end to the carnage. 
In the end, however, nothing better illustrates Eichmann’s strident 
devotion to the killing of every last Jew than evidence which the 
prosecution called “the gravest we are able to submit against the 
accused”—his successful effort to override Hitler himself.68 
To obtain the assent of the Hungarian Regent to the deportation of 
Hungarian Jews in general, Hitler had agreed with the Regent that 
eighty-seven hundred Jewish families could be saved, be given transit 
visas to Switzerland and then be permitted to go to Palestine.69 This 
 
 61.  HILBERG, supra note 55, at 796, 823. 
 62. See Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 943. 
 63.  Id. at 731. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. at 732, 1785–90. 
 67. Id. at 730. 
 68. Id. at 108 (referring to the Veesenmeyer telegram). 
 69. Id. at 1087–88. 
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numbered about forty thousand Jews.70 When Eichmann became aware 
of this understanding between Hitler and the Hungarian Regent, he 
immediately tried to undermine it.  All of this was reported in a 
telegram that the German Ambassador to Hungary, Edmund 
Veesenmeyer, sent to Berlin.71 He wrote that about forty thousand 
“souls” and one thousand children were to be given visas for 
Switzerland.72 He then notes that Eichmann does not agree to their 
transit to Switzerland and “under any circumstances to the emigration of 
Hungarian Jews to Palestine. The Jews who are under consideration 
constitute, without exception, valuable human material from a 
biological point of view.”73 Veesenmayer notes that Eichmann asked for 
reconsideration of the decision to let the Jews reach Switzerland and 
then Palestine. Eichmann also asked that if such reconsideration were 
not granted, additional deportations from Budapest should be arranged 
quickly and prior to the arrival of visas to Switzerland.74 Eichmann 
succeeded; Hitler’s agreement with the Regent was never implemented: 
the Jews were not saved.75 
Not one person can be directly responsible for killing six million 
people. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to identify the primary 
culprit. Hitler directed that European Jewry be annihilated; Himmler 
and Goering implemented his direction by in turn directing subordinates 
to do so, and those subordinates furthered the process, either by 
themselves or through others.76 Clearly principal responsibility lies with 
those at the upper levels of this hierarchy. But at some point there was 
need for a “hands-on” director, someone whose full attention was 
devoted to insuring the implementation of the killing process. No one fit 
this description better than Eichmann.  
The prosecution, without defense opposition, was able to prove 
almost the entirety of its case. Perhaps Arendt was too influenced by the 
Eichmann in the dock—or in the glass booth in this case—and thus saw 
more clown than monster. The trial, however, was not about the 
captured Eichmann of 1961 forced to confront his words and his deeds. 
 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 1087. 
 72. VEESENMAYER TELEGRAM [VEESENMAYER CABLE] (Jul. 25, 1944) (Ger.) (on file with 
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review).  
      73. See Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 1088. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. “Final Solution”: Overview, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L MUSEUM, 
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005151 (last visited Feb. 4, 2013). 
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It was about the Eichmann of 1941–1945 who was not forced to 
confront anything. Instead he implemented, with relish, determination, 
and frightening thoroughness, Hitler’s plan for the annihilation of 
European Jewry. There was nothing “clownish” about that Eichmann 
and certainly a great deal of “monster.”77 
Finally, a word on the fairness of the trial. Arendt, who 
acknowledged that Israel was the correct place to try Eichmann, makes 
the point that defense witnesses were excluded since, had they come to 
Israel, they would have been exposed to prosecution under the same law 
under which Eichmann was prosecuted.78 The prosecution explicitly 
failed to promise such witnesses immunity. She suggests that the 
prosecution’s refusal to immunize Eichmann’s defense witnesses was 
unfair to Eichmann.79 On closer analysis, it is clear that the Israeli 
prosecutors did far more than is conventionally done to accommodate a 
criminal defendant. 
First, perhaps Arendt was not aware that the scenario she describes 
is common in criminal practice. While the prosecution has the power to 
confer immunity on witnesses, the defense does not. Consequently, it is 
not unusual for the defense to be impaired in calling witnesses. Such 
potential witnesses refuse to testify because they fear that if they testify 
and acknowledge facts that might be incriminating their testimony will 
be used against them in a subsequent prosecution. To single out Israel 
for following a practice standard in the Anglo-American legal system is 
unwarranted. 
Second, Israel went out of its way to accommodate the defense. 
Ordinarily, once the prosecution refuses to immunize potential defense 
witnesses, the matter is over. It was not over in Eichmann’s case. Rather 
than just refusing immunity to any of Eichmann’s potential witnesses, 
the prosecution assented to their deposition in German courts, 
depositions that were evidentiary and could then be used at the trial in 
 
 77. Arendt also questions the prosecution’s effort to hold Eichmann responsible for the 
“crimes in the east,” observing that his principal responsibilities were in Germany, 
Czechoslovakia, Austria, and later Hungary. ARENDT, supra note 36, at 212–19. The problem is 
that she approaches the trial as an exposition under the rules governing a historian writing history. 
These are not, however, the rules of the trial where the broader concept of agency, triggered by 
the charges of collective action, govern. Furthermore, Arendt is simply wrong on the facts. 
Rudolph Hoss, commandant of Auschwitz from 1940 until late 1943, both in his trial and at the 
main trial at Nuremberg, testified how Eichmann, pursuant to the instructions of Heinrich 
Himmler, head of the SS, was instrumental in the running of the Auschwitz death camp.  See also 
Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 256–57. 
 78. ARENDT, supra note 36, at 220–21.  
 79. Id.  
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Jerusalem.80 Numerous depositions were taken in Germany; someone 
from the prosecution staff attended and Dieter Wechtenbruch, a Munich 
attorney and assistant to Servatius, appeared on behalf of Eichmann.81 
This accommodation is far more than the general prosecutorial inaction 
when confronted with defense claims that its witnesses refuse to testify 
for the defense out of fear of prosecution. 
There is an even more fundamental flaw in the notion that the 
Israeli prosecutor’s refusal to grant defense witness immunity was 
causal in impairing Eichmann’s defense. As has been noted, several 
depositions were taken in German courts. Had a defense witness 
testified to facts in Germany implicating him or her in the Holocaust, 
what was to stop Israel from charging that person and asking for his or 
her extradition? Or what was to stop the German government from 
using the information provided in the deposition as the basis for a 
prosecution under German law? A large number of Germans were 
prosecuted in Germany before and after the Eichmann trial for crimes 
relating to the Holocaust.82 Thus, anyone testifying to incriminating 
facts in the depositions faced exactly the same risk as he or she would 
have faced if the testimony were provided in Israel itself. 
Lastly, there is a larger irony in this unfair criticism of the 
prosecution. The depositions that were taken in Germany contained a 
great deal of information helpful to the prosecution and inconsistent 
with the notion that Eichmann’s role was as minimal as he said, and as 
Arendt believed. For example, Eichmann wanted to call Dr. Franz Six. 
Six occupied numerous positions in the Nazi hierarchy, perhaps the 
most notorious as a commander in the infamous Einsatzgruppen.83 He 
had been convicted in the Einsatzgruppen trial in 1948 and was 
sentenced to twenty years in prison.84 The sentence was subsequently 
reduced and he was released in the early 1950s.85 Six, designated as a 
defense witness by Eichmann, had the following to say when questioned 
in Germany: 
 
 80. See, e.g., Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 1906–08 (transcript of Hans Jüttner’s 
deposition in Germany submitted as part of the official trial transcript in Israel). 
 81. See id. at 1906 (showing Dieter Wechtenbruch as “present” at the deposition). 
 82. Trials of War Criminals, SHOAH RESOURCE CENTER, 
http://www1.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%205887.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 
2013). 
 83.  Richard Breitman, Interagency Working Group: Historical Analysis of Twenty Name 
Files from CIA Records, NAT’L ARCHIVES (Apr. 2001), 
http://www.archives.gov/iwg/declassified-records/rg-263-cia-records/rg-263-report.html. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
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Had I wished to obtain an exemption . . . for a Jew, I would not have 
gone to Eichmann, as he was an exponent for the other side. 
. . . . 
I believed that, when in doubt, Eichmann always acted in accordance 
with Party doctrine in its most extreme form. 
Six went on to confirm that it was possible to be transferred to other 
operations in the war; Six had been transferred.86 Finally, and most 
importantly, Six perceived that Eichmann had “wider powers than other 
Section Heads” and there was a “general impression” that “Eichmann 
was not only under Mueller’s orders, but that he was somewhat on the 
same level as Mueller.”87 
The Eichmann trial stands out as a commitment to justice and a 
service to history. It dealt fairly with Eichmann, and contributed 
enormously to an exposure of the Holocaust and to its horrors. Much 
has been done in the period since the trial to institutionalize a response 
to genocide. That genocide continues cannot be laid at the doorstep of 
those involved in the Eichmann case. They did their part. 
 
 86. Eichmann Trial Record, supra note 5, at 1836. Eichmann had testified he tried to obtain 
a transfer but that was impossible.  
 87. Id. 
